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This paper examines the notion of “pluriverse”, which has increasingly been used in the past few 
years in several strands of critical humanities associated with the so-called “ontological turn”: 
science and technology studies (Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers), critical geography and political 
ontology (Mario Blaser), cultural anthropology (Marisol de la Cadena, Arturo Escobar, Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro), decolonial thought (Walter Mignolo), or posthuman feminism (Donna 
Haraway). These various iterations of the figure of the pluriverse constitute a loose network of 
textual traces, a supposedly new scene for ‘humanities’, organized around what is understood as a 
pluralistic ontology. In political terms, the discourse of the pluriverse presents itself as a strategic 
response to the violence of universalism. It advocates for a multiversal ethics, a pluriversal 
cosmopolitics based on interspecies and multi-natural kinships, one more aware of the multiplicity 
of worlds and world-making practices that make up the post-globalization scene. 
Based on readings of Bruno Latour, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Arturo Escobar, and Marisol de 
la Cadena among others, I argue that the notion of pluriversality remains self-contradictory and 
self-defeating as long as it relies on an ontological representation of world/worlds in the form of 
copresence. Drawing on Derrida’s deconstruction of the concept of world (cosmos, mundus) in his 
late writings, I propose to think an exorbitant plurality, before the pluriverse and before being. 
Beyond ontological pluralism, Derrida’s “infinity of untranslatable worlds” also signifies an 
irreducible interruption, the end of the world, of any “world-in-common”, thus raising the stakes 
for the ethical demand towards the other. 
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Uses of “the Pluriverse”:  
Cosmos, Interrupted – or the Others of Humanities 
 
 
“like philosophy and the deconstruction of the philosophical,  
decolonization is interminable” 
— Jacques Derrida1 
 
This paper constitutes a brief intervention within an enormous subject – a subject bigger 
than the world itself. Here I will speak mainly about one word, one single word that has 
recently made its way into many, many disciplines or sub-disciplines of what we may call 
“critical humanities” at large. This word is “pluriverse”. What follows, then, is a sort of 
mapping of the uses of this word – “pluriverse” – in contemporary critical humanities, as 
well as a short analysis of the theoretical problems I have encountered while researching 
this literature. 
The discourse of pluriversality 
The motif of the pluriverse has increasingly been used in the past few years in several 
strands of critical humanities. Schematically and non-exclusively, these fields are: science 
and technology studies (Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers), critical geography and political 
ontology (Mario Blaser), cultural anthropology (Marisol de la Cadena, Arturo Escobar, 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro), decolonial thought (Walter Mignolo), and posthuman 
feminism (Donna Haraway). These various iterations of the figure of the pluriverse 
constitute a loose, though astonishingly coherent network of textual traces, building up a 
supposedly new “scene” or new “stage” for the humanities, organized around what is 
understood as a pluralistic ontology or an ontological pluralism – and, here, William James, 
Alfred North Whitehead, and Gilles Deleuze are usually cited as major philosophical 
influences.2 
 
In practical or political terms, the discourse of the pluriverse presents itself as a strategic 
response to the excess and violence of universalism and Western imperialism. It advocates 
for a multiversal ethics, a pluriversal cosmopolitics based on interspecies and multinatural 
kinships, and more aware of the multiplicity of worlds and world-making practices that 
make up the post-globalization scene. I will explain all this in a moment. First, I would 
like to draw attention to an interesting phenomenon linked to the conditions of 
enunciation of the type of literature I am looking at. In all aforementioned iterations, the 
term “pluriverse” is presented as a conceptual tool meant to regenerate or revitalize the 
humanities. In the literature that I am mapping here, the paradigm of the pluriverse is 
explicitly presented as brand new: the thinkers of the pluriverse are conscious to perform or 
to witness a sea change, a major theoretical and practical shift in the very structure of the 
humanities. I want to insist on this point: all contemporary discourses on the pluriverse 
are produced through a self-aware performance, which systematically emphasizes their 
own novelty and the way in which they completely break away from past interpretative 
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models – starting with those attached to European “modernity”. These self-reflexive 
discussions are systematic and often elaborate. For instance, Bruno Latour and Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro offer long and elaborate epistemological reflections involving 
metadiscursive discussions of the history of philosophy, of anthropology, and of their 
interrelationship. They strategically position themselves within the contemporary field, 
describing how they radically break away from past traditions within their discipline. 
Because they blend the philosophical with the autobiographical, these historiographical 
discussions on science and theory are always fascinating and revealing.3 
 
This metadiscursive tendency goes hand in hand with the affirmation of what has been 
called “the ontological turn”.4 In the context of anthropological studies, this turn was 
more particularly theorized by Arturo Escobar,5 but all aforementioned authors embrace 
the necessity to turn to what they call “ontology”. This turn suggests that the logic of the 
pluriverse will allow accounting for worlds and life-worlds exceeding the narrow scope of 
European humanities. As can be inferred from my title, I want to draw attention to the 
notion that the pluriversal discourse concerns not only other humanities (chiefly non-
Western, non-European humanities, in particular indigenous knowledges and practices), 
but also other-than-humanities – human and non-human agents or actants, objects, animal 
worlds or what Peruvian anthropologist Marisol de la Cadena calls “earth beings”,6 or 
what Latour calls “the humans, the non-humans, and the gods”.7 
 
How are we to analyze the textual network that makes up this pluriversal “scene”? An 
easy option would be to consider the disseminal diffusion of this word, “pluriverse”, and 
the “ontological turn” that goes with it simply as a trend, as a phenomenon of fashion. 
That would certainly be true, to some extent, and not that surprising. The intellectual 
field, just like any other, is naturally prone to these forms of “trending” through 
buzzwords, as long as they can help sell books or secure positions within academia. But, 
surely, this type of explanation would not be very interesting. First, there is nothing wrong 
with trending or fashion per se. Second, explaining and dismissing a scholarly trend by 
reducing it to a “phenomenon of fashion” does not in fact explain anything; it does not 
help understand the novelty or the necessity of what is happening at this very moment. 
On this subject, I would like to recall what Derrida had to say in 1963, in “Force and 
signification”, about the so-called “fashion” of structuralism: 
 
To grasp the profound necessity hidden beneath the incontestable phenomenon of 
fashion, it is first necessary to operate negatively: the choice of a word is first an 
ensemble – a structural ensemble, of course – of exclusions. To know why one says 
“structure” is to know why one no longer wishes to say eidos, “essence”, form, Gestalt, 
“ensemble”, “composition”, “complex”, “construction”, “correlation”, “totality”, 
“Idea”, “organism”, “state”, “system”, etc. One must understand not only why each 
of these words showed itself to be insufficient but also why the notion of structure 
continues to borrow some implicit signification from them and to be inhabited by 
them.8 
 
Let us follow Derrida’s injunction “to operate negatively”. As hinted above, it is not 
necessary to go very far in order to understand the types of “exclusions” that are 
performed through the narrative of the pluriverse. In fact it is all there: in the “turn”. 
Massively and conspicuously, the so-called “ontological turn” presents itself as a reaction 
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against the so-called “linguistic turn”. This reaction involves, of course, a certain 
homogenization and a mischaracterization of multiple authors or schools of thought that 
are all put in the same “linguistic” bag. Here I will emphasize the misrepresentation of 
Jacques Derrida’s thought and of deconstruction, for theoretical and strategic reasons. 
This emphasis will provide the general orientation of this paper, before I return more 
explicitly to Derrida and deconstruction in my concluding remarks, wherein I will 
examine the questions of text and translation in relation to notions such as “cosmos” and 
“pluriverse”. My claim is that the misrepresentation of Derrida and of “deconstruction” 
more generally is in fact instrumental to the self-positing of discourses pertaining to the 
ontological turn. They claim scholarly legitimacy either by ignoring or by 
mischaracterizing Derrida’s position, and by locating his work within the so-called 
“linguistic turn”.9 In excluding or misrepresenting what they call “deconstruction”, the 
discourses of the pluriverse present themselves as novel – they perform their own novelty 
and necessity.10 
Pluriverse and ontology: Cosmopolitical wars 
So, what are this novelty and this necessity? The discourse of the pluriverse presents itself 
as a response to the challenges of the Anthropocene: 
 
Accompanying the explosion of political and scholarly discussions about the 
Anthropocene has been the explosion of protests coming from worlds – usually 
labeled indigenous – currently threatened by the possibility of immediate destruction 
by anthropogenic practices.11 
 
Thinkers such as de la Cadena, Blaser, Latour and Viveiros de Castro invite us to 
consider how the Anthropocene compels us to rethink the apparent separation between 
humanity and nature. According to the proponents of the ontological turn in 
anthropology and science studies, the separation between humanity and nature is a chief 
trait of Western epistemology. Western tradition conceptualizes this separation 
(humanity/nature) as a division between subject and object, between culture and nature, 
between the inside (the mind) and the outside (the world’s reality).12 In Western 
(European) modern epistemology, there is only one world, one nature, and the various 
practices of scientific or nonscientific knowledge apply themselves to this unique world as 
from the outside. In this picture, there is only one Nature and there are multiple cultural 
outlooks on that one Nature. This is what Latour calls, with reference to Philippe 
Descola’s work, the “mononaturalism” and “multiculturalism” of Western tradition, as 
reflected in what Latour names “the modern attitude”.13 This modern attitude is 
presented as an essentially epistemological outlook on Nature, which involves the notion that 
language is meant to describe a preexisting, transcendent world – with an emphasis on 
the real as external to the human, to the symbolic, and to language in general. In this 
perspective, Western thought and Eurocentric epistemology (the so-called scientific, 
modern attitude) was in the position of presenting itself as the only correct attitude 
towards the World, towards Nature understood as unique and univocal. It is, in fact, an 
essential trait of the notions of “the universe” and “universality” (one world) that the truth 
expressed about the universe can only be univocal, too. The imposition of this one and 
	5 
only correct attitude (the scientific, European outlook) has enabled a politics and an 
epistemic violence that are intrinsically colonialist and imperialist. Universality as an 
epistemological framework and colonial imperialism go hand in hand. 
 
In contradistinction, new ontological anthropologies and science studies propose to 
sidestep the shortcomings of European epistemology – and of the “linguistic turn”, which 
is considered as merely a continuation of it – in order to access directly to other worlds 
and world-makings understood as divergent “ontologies”. The ontological discourse on 
the pluriverse thus presents itself as a discourse of pure immanence, an immanent 
ontology (or ontologies) of the world (or worlds). 
 
It is no longer a matter of comparing cultures against a background of Nature, but of 
contrasting more and more sharply the ontologies of which just one, ours, uses the 
schema of mononaturalism and multiculturalism.14 
 
In the pluriversal discourse, the Western conception of Nature as one and unique is thus 
presented as one “cosmology” or “cosmovision” among others. Here, the main idea is 
that the world and worlds cannot be separated from the cosmology that makes them up: 
the (undeniable) fact that there exist numerous, incompatible cosmologies would thus 
entail, not that there is one world and various cultural or epistemological outlooks on this 
world (Nature), but, on the contrary, that these various ontologies already testify to the 
multiplicity or plurality of worlds. The shift, therefore, would be from “epistemology” to 
“ontology” (or, rather, “ontologies”), which suggests another shift in the meaning of 
“cosmology”: cosmologies should no longer be understood as epistemological “knowings” 
(descriptive discourses on the world), but as ontological makings of world/worlds. As 
Latour convincingly explains, the separation between ontology and epistemology (and, as 
we shall see, politics) was in fact an artificial separation implemented by Western 
modernity – a separation that, actually, was never effective or operational as such. The 
ontological turn aims to repair this separation and to think the radical inseparability 
between ontology, epistemology, and politics – for instance in the form of cosmology. 
 
Because this ontological focus on cosmologies implies the pluralization of the cosmos 
(cosmoi) and of discourses on/of the cosmos (cosmologies), it involves taking into account 
cosmologies as constructed and contingent. This also implies analyzing the modes and the 
practices of world-building – which Latour or de la Cadena call “worlding”, that is, how 
various world-ontologies, cosmologies, and metaphysics come into being through world-
building practices. This is why anthropology (in a broad sense) is the inevitable tool for 
this whole undertaking. As Viveiros de Castro puts it: “Anthropology would be thus in a 
position to furnish the new metaphysics of the ‘Anthropocene’”.15 
 
What is at stake, thus, is the new status and function of what is still called “anthropology”. 
The rethinking of this status and function – especially in relation to “philosophy” and 
“ontology”, as is usually the case in these sorts of apparent paradigm shifts – is made 
necessary by the theoretical and epistemological requirements of the “ontological turn”. 
As paradoxical as it may seem, the new “anthropology” is understood neither as a human 
discourse, nor as a discourse on the human, on the anthropos. On the contrary, it supposes 
taking into consideration the interconnected agencies of both human and non-human 
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actors, including the agency of so-called “objects”, imaginary beings, or natural forces – 
all actors and agents (actants, to speak like Latour) that became neutralized and 
deprivileged by the Western epistemology of the modern (scientific) attitude. The 
discourse of the pluriverse is thus conceived of as “representing, symbolically and 
materially, the ultimate decentralization of the human”.16 It presents itself as intrinsically 
“nonmodern”,17 or posthuman. In this depiction, language, human language, no longer 
possesses any privilege. Language is conceived as immediately material, as embodied and 
embedded in material practices, and – as a material practice – it participates in the 
ontological networks or assemblages that make up the world or worlds. As Latour writes: 
“We are now faced with many different practical metaphysics, many different practical 
ontologies.”18 
 
In this perspective, ontology is always an ontology of the act, of the agency of actants, 
whatever their ontological status (human, non-human, objects, gods and earth beings, 
etc.). This ontology is therefore conceived of as intrinsically pragmatic and performative. 
Cosmologies are understood as performative worldings, as interconnected practices, and their 
interactions are envisaged under the form of a renewed political ontology: 
 
Political Ontology, as we are using it here, operates on the presumption of divergent 
worldings constantly coming about through negotiations, enmeshments, crossings, 
and interruptions. [...] Political Ontology thus simultaneously stands for reworking 
an imaginary of politics (the pluriverse), for a field of study and intervention (the 
power-charged terrain of entangled worldings and their dynamics), and for a 
modality of analysis and critique that is permanently concerned with its own effects 
as a worlding practice.19 
 
Before I explore further the philosophical implications of the shift towards 
“anthropological ontology”, I would like to say a few words about this notion of “political 
ontology”. This point concerns the ethico-political questions raised by the so-called 
“ontological turn”, especially in the form of a “political ontology” of “the pluriverse”. The 
problem has to do with the question of ontology in relation to political “reality”, or 
realism: all the discourses discussed here present themselves as returning to realism after 
the “linguistic turn”, or as forms of “radical realism” or “radical empiricism”.20 Certainly, 
the “reality” at stake here is understood as intrinsically constructed and contingent, and 
as ontologically pluralist. However, the uncritical articulation between realism and 
ontology comes with problems.21 To put it in broad terms, it is unclear how the reference 
to “political ontology” in the above quotation can entirely avoid the risk of essentializing 
the practices of worldings (“divergent worldings”) that make up worlds-in-common, and 
thus of conferring ontological solidity to “worlding” as a practice, as an act – be it 
understood as a “performative” act, performed by “actants” through rituals, “trials” 
(épreuves), and “performances”. Certainly, one could argue that what I have just described 
is in fact the whole point of “the ontological turn” and of “the pluriversal cosmopolitics”: 
to give ontological solidity and epistemological dignity to discourses (cosmologies) and 
practices (of world-making) that were until now deprivileged and discredited by the 
Western epistemology of the Universal (the modern, scientific attitude). Certainly.  
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However, this “radical realism”22 or hyper-pragmatism, because it is grounded in 
ontological immanence, brings about a lot of ethico-political problems and theoretical 
difficulties which all have to do with the conflation between the political and the 
ontological. Let me explain: while the pluriversal logic is mobilized to circumvent the 
violence of Western epistemology against indigenous practices, the ontological grounding 
of pluriversal “worldings” imposes an understanding of pragmatics that must, by 
necessity, conflate, at least provisionally, the “constative” and “performative” dimensions 
of such “worlding practices”.23 In this conflation, the “constative” dimension (the “old”, 
epistemological, Eurocentric representation of the Universe: knowledge as truth-knowing) 
and the “performative” dimension (“new” practical ontologies: worldings as world-
making practices) must run the risk of becoming contaminated by each other – enough, at 
least, to trouble the conceptual limits of “worlding” as opposed to “knowing” (and thus of 
the “new” “pluralist ontology” as opposed to traditional Western “epistemology”). The 
positing of worlding practices in the form of an ontology (or ontologies) cannot not risk 
becoming an epistemological practice of knowing or self-knowing of such practices in 
essential terms – and, here, we are talking about practices of “worlding”, of “worlding-in-
common”, according to rules or laws (nomos) that must be stated as much as they must be 
constructed or composed: in short, they must be performed. In other words, claiming to sidestep 
all the problems related to “language” and “epistemology” by recurring to “ontology” 
can only result in absolutizing a certain “language” and “epistemology”, thus blinding 
ontology to its own epistemic or linguistic (performative) violence. The most immediate 
consequence is that the ontologization of worlding practices cannot not result in 
essentializing these practices, as well as the performative violence and forceful 
legitimation of such practices, and thus in erasing otherness and heterogeneity within each 
and every “world”, within each and every “world-in-common” or “community”. What 
the ontological turn was meant to avoid – the forceful imposition of the transcendence of 
the world – is in fact repeated by the pluriversal discourse at another level, that of each 
and every cosmology, each and every “world-making” – understood as effects of 
commonality constructed within the limits (the sovereign limits) of each and every “world”. 
All this (the world, its violence, its force of law, its nomos) comes with the territory. It 
follows that, in its ontological form, “the pluriverse” cannot fulfill its promise of pluralism. 
It cannot think its own violence, that is, the performative violence of ontological 
sovereignty, wherein ontology, epistemology and politics become indistinguishable. 
 
This problem, potentially disastrous in my view, is made particularly apparent by the 
uncritical recourse to “political ontology” as an operative concept, itself grounded in 
references to Carl Schmitt and his famous quote from The Concept of the Political: “The 
political world is a pluriverse, not a universe.”24 This reference to Schmitt is made by 
both Marisol de la Cadena and Bruno Latour in a seemingly uncritical manner. One 
must assume that the justification for decolonial and pluriversal thinkers’ reference to 
Schmitt is their common critique of “universalism”. As Latour writes:  
 
If this be peace, I must say I prefer war. By war I mean a conflict for which there is 
no agreed-upon arbiter, a conflict in which what is at stake is precisely what is common 
in the common world to be built. [...] To use Schmitt again: Westerners have not 
understood themselves as facing on the battlefield an enemy whose victory is 
possible, just irrational people who have to be corrected. As I have argued elsewhere, 
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Westerners have until now been engaged in pedagogical wars. But things have changed 
of late and our wars are now wars of the worlds, because it’s now the makeup of the 
cosmos that is at stake. Nothing is off limits, off the table, for dispute.25 
 
I cannot expose here all the theoretical and ethico-political problems that crop up in this 
reference to Schmitt’s political ontology – some are massive and obvious, others more 
insidious. In a sense, Latour’s call for a conflictual pluralization of world-making practices 
does indeed allow for a salutary decentralization of Western imperialism. However, 
anchoring this pluralizing effort within an ontology remains highly problematic. A good 
starting point to analyze this problem might be to deconstruct the common and 
continuous reference, massive and uncritical, to anthropology as ontology in all these 
pluriversal discourses (Schmittian and/or decolonial). 
Anthropology and philosophy: “Cosmologies” 
In all its iterations, the pluriversal gesture involves a reassessment, in ontological terms, of 
the relationship between philosophy and anthropology. Indeed, according to Latour, 
philosophy as ontology is conceived as “the science of being-as-being”, while 
anthropology is presented as “the science of being-as-other”.26 In this perspective, 
anthropology would be the discipline (Latour says “science”) we need in order to grasp 
divergent ontologies, different worlds, different cosmologies. And, as such, it would be the 
most potent tool for an effective decolonization of thought. According to Viveiros de 
Castro, anthropology would thus constitute the discourse of “ontological alterity”27 – or, 
to speak like Patrice Maniglier: “anthropology is the formal ontology of ourselves as 
variants”.28  
 
What we have here is a conception of alterity as variant of ourselves, as other possibilities, 
other potentialities that can be grasped in the form of ontology. Other possible worlds, 
conceived in the form of being, being-possible. It goes without saying that this strictly 
ontological anchoring of alterity differs grandly from Derrida’s reading of alterity; in the 
discourse of ontological anthropology, alterity is understood as being reducible to being, 
and conceived within the framework of a strict ontology, be it a pluralistic ontology or an 
ontology of virtuality or potentiality (that is, the very bedrock of European philosophy 
and epistemology).29 And this is why these anthropological ontologies resist, precisely, 
deconstruction. The other must be graspable, in her being, in the form of being-present, 
so that a certain commonality be achieved, even if that is in and through the affirmation 
of a plurality of worlds or of a “compositionist” cosmopolitics. In Latour’s words: 
“cosmopolitics are up against a somewhat more daunting task: to see how this ‘same 
world’ can be slowly composed.”30 Certainly, the “composition” that Latour advocates for 
presupposes the plurality of worlds, the pluriverse – this is what compels him to surround 
the expression “same world” with scare quotes. But, as you can see, before or after 
“composition”, the pluriverse, the word “pluriverse”, becomes precisely what instantiates 
this commonality, this being-in-common. This signifies that the pluriverse is pluralistic 
only on the backdrop of a commonality of being, of a “flat ontology”, of an anthropology 
embracing the principle of “the univocity of Being” (usually understood through 
Deleuze’s reading of Scotus)31 – which anthropologists translate into what they call 
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“parallel ontologies” or “symmetric anthropology”. The univocity of being is put forward 
as the principle of a fundamental symmetry between worlds – what Marisol de la Cadena 
calls “the ontological copresence” of worlds32 – a copresence that is also envisaged, as we 
saw, as a potential conflict between worlds, and this with reference to both Carl Schmitt and 
Chantal Mouffe. In fact, ontological antagonism (Schmitt) or agonism (Mouffe) is always-
already conceived of as an effect of symmetry: a symmetry between presences, between 
present worlds, within a “multipolar world”.33 Be it said in passing, this problem also 
raises the question of immemorial or future worlds: What of non-present worlds? – Not 
only past or future worlds that exceed the presence of “our” present, and that cannot be 
thought in the form of “copresence”, but also, and above all, worlds that exceed the 
horizon of all presents, worlds that exceed the presence of any present? What status for 
“worlds” that remain ungraspable in the form of being-present? What of those “worlds” 
apparently irreducible to what one calls “world” in the language of ontology and 
presence? 
 
Therefore, the question remains to know whether the presupposition of symmetric 
ontology is not merely wishful thinking, and – perhaps even more problematically – if it is 
in fact as pluralistic as it claims to be. Here, it seems to me that critical engagements with 
reflections of Husserlian or Heideggerian types — on the phenomenological nature of 
life-world (Lebenswelt), or on the ontological question of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-
Sein) — could be useful so that the discussion of cosmology does not fall back into a mere 
collision of divergent “world views” within the “same world” – a risk which Latour seems 
to be aware of: 
 
The singular term cosmology, a property of the exact sciences, and the plural term 
cosmologies, used in a somewhat casual fashion by anthropologists to describe 
diverse world views, are now converging within an enclosure that has become the 
new political world, that of contemporary cosmopolitics.34 
 
There would be a lot to say about the above quote, and Latour’s use of the term 
“cosmology”. First, Latour mentions that the term is used in a casual fashion by 
anthropologists, which raises the question of the potential translation of the term from the 
field of “the exact sciences” to that of anthropology. For that matter, it would be 
interesting to actually analyze how these discourses of the pluriverse relate 
(epistemologically, ontologically, or metaphorically) to the prediction of “the many-world 
theories” such as described by Everett, DeWitt, or Tegmark35 – but this will be for 
another essay... Second, here Latour seems to admit, in passing, that the perspective of 
ontological cosmologies indeed amounts to a collision of “world views” – which seems to 
defeat the whole point of the pluriversal logic and of the ontological turn in general. My 
conviction is that this difficulty relates, once again, to the preservation of the ontological 
anchorage of the cosmological: how can the notion of cosmology, understood as logos, as 
discourse on the world – how can it fully escape the traps of logocentrism such as 
described by Derrida as one of the most entrenched characteristics of Western thought? 
This question was anticipated by our analysis of the potential intercontamination between 
“constative” and “performative” – an intercontamination which threatens all “practical 
ontology” that also presents itself as a theoretical discourse, a knowledge or wisdom, in the 
form of a logos, be it an anthropo-logy, a cosmo-logy or an onto-logy. All these discourses 
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participate in the metaphysics of presence first and foremost because they are ontological 
claims on the presence of world or worlds, of worlding as world-building practice. 
Pluralizing presence merely confirms the metaphysics of presence. Here the pluralization 
of worlds remains captive to the univocity of being and presence. This is why the 
reference to logos – and the logocentrism that goes with it – cannot avoid bringing the 
pluriversal discourse dangerously close to an “epistemology” in the traditional Western 
sense of the term, and thus to the anthropocentrism and linguisticism that characterize 
Western logocentric epistemology. It follows that the recourse to pluriversal cosmopolitics 
falls back into a mere collision of “world views” – that is, the very thing that was meant to 
be avoided by recurring to the pluriversal logic: the Western concept of the world. 
 
I say “Western”, because one thing that is in fact never put to question by the ontological 
discourse on the pluriverse is precisely the Western concept of world, the lexicon of 
cosmos and cosmology, as it has always been somewhat embedded into an ontological 
discourse. Pluralizing “cosmos”, pluralizing the Western concept of “the world”, 
pluralizing “cosmologies”, does not solve the problems that are inherent to this 
conceptuality. First, this very concept (“world”) has always been somewhat plural and 
pluralized – it is itself divided, complex, and the locus of immemorial epistemological and 
ontological battles within Western tradition: cosmos, mundus, world, Welt, monde, mundo, etc. 
– all these words, which are as many worlds, are never interrogated by the literature I am 
mapping here.36 But we can go as far as saying that for the pluriversal thinkers, the 
concept of “world”, the word “world”, is never considered as problematic in itself. It is put 
forward as a seemingly neutral category of thought and practice. Not only the concept of 
“world” remains uninterrogated, and with it all the historical, aesthetic, philosophical, 
theological, and indeed ontological valences it carries; but its translation, the possibility of 
translating “world” from one context to the other, from one world to the other, is never 
considered as problematic either. So much that world means world, exactly, without 
remainder and without failure, in every world and every ontology in which this term, 
“world”, or any of its so-called “translations”, would be uttered – and this is the case as 
much within the framework of Western thought or European philosophy (which is 
presented as “One” and homogeneous, one homogeneous cosmology among others), as 
in all non-Western or indigenous cosmologies or cosmovisions. 
 
Here, the crux of the matter lies precisely in the notion of “cosmology”, and how it 
somewhat undergirds the whole pluriversal ontology. In the pluriversal perspective of a 
flat ontology or parallel anthropologies, all cosmologies must be understood as relating to 
the “same” reality in each and every “world” – that is, not the same reality in the sense 
that they would all refer to the “same” world (of course, the pluriversal logic supposes the 
plurality of worlds), but in the sense that they refer to the “same” referent, the supposed 
reality of a discourse on the world, for and in its own world – a discourse that can be identified 
as such, as cosmological, precisely because it is a discourse on the world, a world-making or 
worlding practice. The worlds (and their afferent cosmologies) must be understood as 
symmetric, and relatively homogeneous in their own ontological status. It is only on the 
backdrop of this assumed symmetry and copresence that a meaningful pluriversal 
ontology can be articulated. In this perspective, pluralizing “cosmologies” does not solve 
this basic problem: the very idea of cosmology must presuppose a minimal preconception 
of what “cosmos” is, and of what a discourse on the cosmos, a “cosmology”, might be. As 
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such, the ontological discourse of the pluriverse remains entrapped in a certain 
representation of the cosmos as self-same, as ipseity (we may call it a “cosmo-onto-
ipsology”) – not only a cosmology in the sense that these anthropologies have established, 
but, first and foremost, a form of arche-cosmology, an originary preconception or pre-
understanding of what the “cosmos” is or supposedly “is”, a concept or pre-concept on the 
basis of which various cosmologies can be deciphered and identified as such – as 
“cosmologies”, as discourses on “the world”, as worlding practice. The discourse of “the 
pluriverse”, despite (or because of) its insistence on plurality, must thus presuppose a 
notion of “world” as transcendental signified – one that is undergirded by, and embedded 
in, the “univocity of being”: an ontology, a cosmo-onto-ipsology of “the world” as 
“being”, as “being-present”, even though it is in a “constructivist” or “compositionist” 
form. It remains the arche-referent of the pluriverse. 
This arche-concept or pre-concept of “world” is of course the European concept of 
cosmos, or a certain representation of it, which thus becomes the arche-cosmos of all 
cosmoi. In this perspective, the word “pluriverse” runs the risk of becoming a mere 
postulate, a figure, or a metaphor – for instance: in the shape of “a world in which many 
worlds fit”; or “a world of many worlds”37 – which, of course, defeats the point of calling 
it “a pluriverse” in the language of ontology.  
Translation before worlds 
The becoming-metaphor of “the pluriverse” thus speaks to the metaphoricity of “world”, 
and to metaphoricity tout court. As already stated, “the pluriverse” is first and foremost a 
discourse. “Pluriverse” is a trace. It is text, before being “something”, and before “being”. 
Because it is text, the pluriversal logic always runs the risk of becoming a mere metaphor. 
However, the ontological turn, because it sidesteps all questions related to language and 
to the symbolic, is particularly poorly prepared to think through this becoming-metaphor 
of ontology and of “the world” (or “worlds”) – that is, the metaphorical essence of its own 
discourse. In effect, whatever ontological or epistemological function it might have, “the 
pluriverse” is first and foremost a word, a motif; it is a textual device. But the discourse of 
the pluriverse, embedded as it is in the ontological turn, operates a systematic reduction 
and a neutralization of discursivity, of its own discourse and language, and, ultimately, of 
the effects of text and textuality in general. It substitutes for the text a plural ontology, an 
ontology of possible worlds – which obfuscates in the same gesture the textual structure of 
“the world” and of “the pluriverse” narrative itself. By the same token, the obfuscation of 
textual matters results in erasing the question of translation, of the violence of translation, 
thus erasing the violence of the ontological gesture while protecting this ontological 
gesture against the exorbitant singularity, the inappropriable otherness of what remains, 
at bottom, untranslatable. In attempting to discard what remains untranslatable in the 
pluriverse – that is, an exorbitant, non-ontological heterogeneity beyond pluralism – the 
ontological discourse of the pluriverse reduces the world or worlds to the possible, to a 
variant of ourselves that can be the object of anthropological inquiry. The other is turned 
into a virtual self-same, a possible version, a virtual “variant” of myself. In doing so, the 
ontological gesture obfuscates the impossible and the untranslatable – which has seriously 
problematic implications in ethical, political, and ontological terms.  
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There is great merit, of course, in attempting to pluralize cosmologies so as to account for 
non-Western cosmologies. However, as long as this pluralization remains embedded in 
cosmo-ontology, it is not certain that it does not reproduce the very logic it is meant to 
sidestep. The representation of worlds put forward by ontological anthropology remains 
resolutely anthropocentric and logocentric. The ontological gesture implemented by the 
discourse of the pluriverse is a gesture of self-protection: it protects anthropology, 
ontology, and ultimately the logos of Western philosophy against the exorbitant 
impossibility of world or worlds beyond present, human cosmoi. It protects itself against an 
exorbitant heterogeneity before language and before being, before the “world” or 
“worlds” themselves – an untranslatable heterogeneity that cannot be accounted for by 
anthropology or ontology, even the most pluralistic of ontologies. 
 
This is why the discourses I have discussed in this paper necessitate the dismissing of 
deconstruction, through its misrepresentation as a mere avatar of the “linguistic turn”. In 
doing so, they strive to reduce Derrida’s thinking of difference as a mere difference 
between language and the world. For instance, Latour attributes to Derrida the 
outlandish claim that these two “ontological domains”38 – “language” and “the world” – 
were separated at birth, thus implying that “we are forever prisoners of language”.39 
However, heterogeneity, for Derrida, is not between language and the world – which is 
why the characterization of deconstruction as illustrating the so-called “linguistic turn” is 
simply false. There is no “prison” of language, quite the opposite. Deconstruction has 
always targeted linguisticism, precisely.40 Linguisticism starts with the ignorance of the 
effects of text, that is, the irreducible heterogeneity of differential traces.41 Heterogeneity 
is before language: heterogeneity before being and before the world “itself”. It supposes a 
radical interruption dividing and traversing epistemologies and ontologies “as such”, 
before and beyond their position and separation as distinct fields or practices. Différance as 
self-interruption is that which enjoins to translate experience, while making all experience 
– the “as such” of experience, so to say – an experience of impossible translation: cosmos, 
interrupted. Self-interruption is what demands translation, by making translation possible 
as impossible: that is, a non-negative impossibility as condition for translating worlds. But 
the singularity of the other remains as such, as otherly, and exceeds any and all 
representation of the world or worlds – be it that of another world. Otherness interrupts 
the world and worlds: it supposes the experience of this very interruption, before and 
beyond the world, any world. Derrida thus points to a radical interruption preceding and 
exceeding cosmos and cosmologies, preceding language and being itself. This is why 
translation is before the world, before ontology, before being.42 And this is what Derrida 
means by “plus d’une langue”43: not only the plurality of languages and the correlated 
necessity to translate, but also the experience of an exorbitant heterogeneity and plurality 
before ontology, one which cannot be simply translated into the language of being. 
 
Yet, Derrida strives to think untranslatability in a non-negative manner, as what propels 
the desire and the necessity to translate: 
 
This untranslatability would no longer be a hermetic limit, the impenetrable opacity 
of a screen, but, on the contrary, an incitement [provocation] to translation – already a 
commitment to translate within the experience of the untranslatable as such. To 
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apprehend the untranslatable, to apprehend it as such [...] is therefore already a trial 
[épreuve], the first trial of the call to translate.44 
 
It is on the backdrop of this non-ontologizable experience of interruptiveness and 
untranslatability that an experience of world or worlds, of worldliness – as well as any 
experience in general as experience of the other (which we could call, with a wink to Latour, 
Derrida’s “radical empiricism”) – becomes possible: 
 
In other words, what imposes itself here is the question of the horizon of expectation, 
that is, the question of an experience without a horizon of expectation: relation to the 
future [avenir], to the other, to the event – and to death, beyond any horizon of 
expectation, that is to say, beyond any possible world, beyond any world that is a 
priori possible as such. [...] 
 
And yet there is “world” [Et pourtant il y a du “monde”]. Ultimately, this infinite alterity, 
this infinite irreducibility of an incommensurable distance, this absolute 
incommensurability doesn’t stop things from happening [que quelque chose arrive]: 
speaking to one another, waging wars, dreaming of peace, being overwhelmed by 
compassion. To the contrary: this alterity, this impossibility is the condition for them 
to happen. There is an infinity of untranslatable worlds and this untranslatability is 
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